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Abstract
We model belief change due to noisy sensing, and
belief introspection in the framework of the situa-
tion calculus. We give some properties of our ax-
iomatization and show that it does not suffer from
the problems with combining sensing, introspec-
tion, and plausibility update described in Shapiro
et al. [2000].
1 Introduction
In this paper, we generalize the framework of Shapiro et al.
[2000], where belief change due to sensing was combined
with belief introspection in the situation calculus. In that
framework, sensing was assumed to be infallible and the plau-
sibilities of alternate situations (i.e., possible worlds) were
fixed in the initial state, never to be updated. Here, we re-
lax both assumptions. That is, we model noisy sensors whose
readings may stray from reality and may return different val-
ues in subsequent readings. We also allow the plausibilities of
situations to change over time, bringing the framework more
in line with traditional models of belief change. We give some
properties of our axiomatization and show that it does not suf-
fer from the problems with combining sensing, introspection,
and plausibility update described in Shapiro et al. In the next
section, we present the situation calculus including the repre-
sentation of beliefs, and Shapiro et al.’s framework. In Sec. 4,
we present the formal details of our axiomatization of belief
change. In Sec. 5, we present some properties of our axioma-
tization, and in Sec. 6, we conclude and discuss future work.
2 Situation Calculus
The basis of our framework for belief change is an action the-
ory [Reiter, 2001] based on the situation calculus [McCarthy
and Hayes, 1969], and extended to include a belief opera-
tor [Scherl and Levesque, 1993]. The situation calculus is
a predicate calculus language for representing dynamically
changing domains. A situation represents a snapshot of the
domain. There is a set of initial situations corresponding to
∗We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this paper.
the ways the agent1 believes the domain might be initially.
The actual initial state of the domain is represented by the
distinguished initial situation constant, S0. The term do(a, s)
denotes the unique situation that results from the agent per-
forming action a in situation s. Thus, the situations can be
structured into a set of trees, where the root of each tree is an
initial situation and the arcs are actions. The initial situations
are defined as those situations that do not have a predecessor
Init(s) def= ¬∃a, s′.s = do(a, s′).
Predicates and functions whose value may change from sit-
uation to situation (and whose last argument is a situation) are
called fluents. For instance, we use the fluent INR1(s) to rep-
resent that the agent is in room R1 in situation s. The effects
of actions on fluents are defined using successor state axioms
[Reiter, 2001], which provide a succinct representation for
both effect axioms and frame axioms [McCarthy and Hayes,
1969]. For example, assume that there are only two rooms,
R1 and R2, and that the action LEAVE takes the agent from
the current room to the other room. Then, the successor state
axiom for INR1 is:2
INR1(do(a, s)) ≡
((¬INR1(s) ∧ a = LEAVE) ∨ (INR1(s) ∧ a 6= LEAVE)).
This axiom asserts that the agent will be in R1 after doing
some action iff either the agent is in R2 (¬INR1(s)) and
leaves it or the agent is currently in R1 and the action is any-
thing other than leaving it.
Moore [1985] defined a possible-worlds semantics for a
modal logic of knowledge in the situation calculus by treat-
ing situations as possible worlds. Scherl and Levesque [1993]
adapted the semantics to the action theories of Reiter [2001].
The idea is to have an accessibility relation on situations,
B(s′, s), which holds if in situation s, the situation s′ is con-
sidered possible by the agent. Note, the order of the argu-
ments is reversed from the usual convention in modal logic.
Levesque [1996] introduced a predicate, SF(a, s), to de-
scribe the result of performing the binary-valued sensing ac-
tion a. SF(a, s) holds iff the sensor associated with a returns
1Here we assume that there is a single agent, however it would
not be difficult to generalize the framework to handle multiple
agents.
2We adopt the convention that unbound variables are universally
quantified in the widest scope.
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the sensing value 1 in situation s. Each sensing action senses
some property of the domain. The property sensed by an ac-
tion is associated with the action using a guarded sensed flu-
ent axiom [De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999]. For example,
suppose that there are lights in R1 and R2 and that LIGHT1(s)
(LIGHT2(s), resp.) holds if the light in R1 (R2, resp.) is on.
Then:
INR1(s) ⊃ (SF(SENSELIGHT, s) ≡ LIGHT1(s))
¬INR1(s) ⊃ (SF(SENSELIGHT, s) ≡ LIGHT2(s))
can be used to specify that the SENSELIGHT action senses
whether the light in the room where the agent is currently
located is on.
Shapiro et al. [2000] adapted Spohn’s ordinal conditional
functions [Spohn, 1988; Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] to the sit-
uation calculus by introducing plausibilities over situations
using a function pl(s) which returns a natural number rep-
resenting plausibility of situation s. The lower the number,
the more plausible the situation is considered. The plausibil-
ities were fixed in the initial situation and were not allowed
to change, i.e., they used this successor state axiom for pl:
pl(do(a, s)) = pl(s). They adopted Scherl and Levesque’s
[2003] successor state axiom for B:3
B(s′′, do(a, s)) ≡
∃s′.B(s′, s) ∧ s′′ = do(a, s′) ∧ (SF(a, s′) ≡ SF(a, s)).
The situations s′′ that are B-related to do(a, s) are the ones
that result from doing action a in a situation s′, such that the
sensor associated with action a has the same value in s′ as it
does in s. In other words, after doing a, the agent’s beliefs
will be expanded to include what the value of the sensor as-
sociated with a is in s. If a is a sensing action, the agent’s
beliefs will also include the property associated with a in the
guarded sensed fluent axiom for a. If a is a physical action,
then the agent’s beliefs will also include the effects of a as
specified by the successor state axioms.
Shapiro et al. defined the beliefs of the agent to be the for-
mula true in the most plausible accessible situations:4
BelS(φ, s)
def
=
∀s′[B(s′, s) ∧ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s) ⊃ pl(s′) ≤ pl(s′′))] ⊃ φ[s′].
Shapiro et al. thus modelled belief change with infallible
sensors. If the agent senses a property φ, and φ actually
holds, then all the situations that satisfy ¬φ become inacces-
sible. For example, if the agent believes ¬φ and senses φ,
then all the most plausible, accessible situations will become
inaccessible. A new set of accessible situations will become
most plausible, all of which satisfy φ, yielding belief in φ.
3For simplicity, we assume here that all actions are always exe-
cutable and omit the action precondition axioms and references to a
Poss predicate that are normally included in situation calculus action
theories.
4We use φ to denote a formula that may contain a distin-
guished situation constant, Now, as a placeholder for a situation,
e.g., INR1(Now). φ[s] denotes the formula that results from substi-
tuting s for Now in φ. Where the intended meaning is clear, we omit
the placeholder.
However, Shapiro et al. did not allow for the possibility of
the agent subsequently sensing ¬φ.
There are various ways of axiomatizing dynamic applica-
tions in the situation calculus. Here we adopt a simple form
of the guarded action theories described by De Giacomo and
Levesque [1999] consisting of: (1) successor state axioms for
each fluent, and guarded sensed fluent axioms for each action,
as discussed above; (2) unique names axioms for the actions,
and domain-independent foundational axioms (we adopt the
ones given by Levesque et al. [1998] which accommodate
multiple initial situations, but we do not describe them fur-
ther here); and (3) initial state axioms, which describe the
initial state of the domain and the initial beliefs of the agent.
In what follows, we will use Σ to refer to a guarded action
theory of this form.
3 Belief Change
Before formally defining a belief operator in this language,
we briefly review the notion of belief change. Belief change,
simply put, aims to study the manner in which an agent’s dox-
astic (belief) state should change when the agent is confronted
by new information. In the literature,there is often a clear
distinction between two forms of belief change: revision and
update. Both forms can be characterized by an axiomatic ap-
proach (in terms of rationality postulates) or through various
constructions (e.g., epistemic entrenchment, possible worlds,
etc.). The AGM theory [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988] is the prototypical
example of belief revision while the KM framework [Katsuno
and Mendelzon, 1991] is often identified with belief update.
Intuitively speaking, belief revision is appropriate for mod-
eling static environments about which the agent has only par-
tial and possibly incorrect information. New information is
used to fill in gaps and correct errors, but the environment
itself does not undergo change. Belief update, on the other
hand, is intended for situations in which the environment it-
self is changing due to the performing of actions.
4 Belief Change with Noisy Sensors
Shapiro et al. [2000] modelled belief change due to sensing
but it was assumed that the sensors were always accurate.
This is quite a strong assumption which we will relax here. If
sensing is exact, then the sensors will never be contradicted
and so belief revision is limited to revising the agents initial
beliefs. But once an initial belief is corrected, it will never
change again. In this context it seems reasonable to have a
fixed plausibility relation. However, if the sensors can return
different results over time, this approach will not work be-
cause after sensing two contradicting values for the same for-
mula, the agent will have contradictory beliefs (i.e., an empty
accessibility relation).
To model noisy sensing, we add another distinguished
predicate SR(a, s), which is similar to SF described previ-
ously. The idea is that while SF(a, s) describes the property
of the world ideally sensed by action a, the actual values re-
turned by the sensor may not correspond exactly to the prop-
erty described by SF. So, we will use SR(a, s) to describe the
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value actually returned by the sensor associated with action a.
Another way of describing SR is that it is the result of adding
noise to the sensor described by SF. How to specify SR is
still an unresolved issue. We want SR to be related to SF but
perhaps only related by a stochastic relation. This problem is
reserved for future work.
As with Shapiro et al., we assume that the agent knows
the history of actions it has taken. By that we mean the agent
only considers a situation possible if it agrees with the history
of actions in the actual situation.5 We further assume that the
agent has privileged access to its sensors. That is, after the
agent reads its sensor, it knows the value of the sensor and
it remembers the sequence of sensor readings it has made to
date. That is, in addition to knowing the history of actions that
have occurred, the agent knows the history of sensor readings
it has taken, and it only considers possible those situations
that agree with the actual situation on the history of sensor
readings.
5 Axiomatization
To model plausibilities that can change, we dispense with the
pl predicate used by Shapiro et al. [2000], and instead add a
plausibility to the accessibility relation. So, B(s′, n, s) will
denote that s′ is considered a possible situation by the agent
with plausibility n in situation s. As before, the lower the
plausibility level the more plausible the agent considers the
situation to be. The beliefs of the agent are determined by
the situations with plausibility 0:
Bel(φ, s) def= ∀s′.B(s′, 0, s) ⊃ φ[s′]
As previously mentioned, we have two further distinguished
predicates: SF(a, s) and SR(a, s), both of which take an ac-
tion and a situation as arguments. The former holds if the
property ideally sensed by sensing action a holds in situation
s, and the latter holds if the sensor associated with a actually
returns the value 1 in s. We adopt the convention that if A is
a non-sensing action, then ∀s.SF(A, s) ∧ SR(A, s) holds.
The dynamics of the agent’s beliefs are formalized by the
successor state axiom for B:
Axiom 1
B(s′′, n′′, do(a, s)) ≡
∃s′, n′.B(s′, n′, s) ∧ s′′ = do(a, s′) ∧
(SR(a, s′) ≡ SR(a, s)) ∧ Update(n′′, n′, a, s′, s),
where Update(n′′, n′, a, s′, s) (defined below) holds if n′′ is
the updated plausibility level due to action a for situation s′
whose plausibility with respect to s is n′.6 In other words, s′′
will be accessible from do(a, s) with plausibility n′′, if there
exist s′ and n′ such that s′ was accessible from s with plausi-
bility n′, s′ and s agree on the value of the sensor associated
with a, and n′′ is the result of updating the plausibility of s′
5A treatment of exogenous actions that are hidden from the agent
was given by Shapiro and Pagnucco [2004].
6Update could be a function, however we found it more conve-
nient to formulate it as a relation.
with respect to s due to a. Note that situations that disagree
with s on the value of the sensor associated with a, (and those
whose last action is not a) are discarded altogether from the
accessibility relation. This means that the agent will never
come to believe that it was mistaken about its sensor readings
(or about the history of action occurrences).
We update the plausibilities as follows. We say a situa-
tion’s (s) sensor reading is correct with respect to the sen-
sor associated with a, if its SF and SR values agree, i.e.,
SR(a, s) = SF(a, s). Those situations whose sensor readings
are correct will have their plausibility levels decreased (i.e.,
they will become more plausible) and the others will have
their plausibility levels increased. For concreteness, we will
use Darwiche and Pearl’s [1997] update function, but others
are possible.
Correct(a, s′) def= SR(a, s′) ≡ SF(a, s′)
Good(s′, n′, a, s) def= B(s′, n′, s) ∧ (SR(a, s′) ≡ SR(a, s)) ∧
Correct(a, s′)
Min(n, a, s) def= (∃s∗Good(s∗, n, a, s)) ∧
∀s′, n′.Good(s′, n′, a, s) ⊃ n′ ≥ n
Update(n′′, n′, a, s′, s) def=
(Correct(a, s′) ⊃ ∃n∗.Min(n∗, a, s) ∧ n′′ = n′ − n∗) ∧
(¬Correct(a, s′) ⊃ n′′ = n′ + 1)
In other words, the situations whose sensor readings are in-
correct have their plausibilities increased by 1. The situations
whose readings are correct are updated by subtracting the Min
value, which is the lowest plausibility among the accessible
situations that agree with the actual situation on the sensor
reading and the sensor reading is correct. The result is that
the agent believes that its sensor reading is correct, since this
will hold in all the 0-plausibility situations.
Following Shapiro et al., we want B(s′, n, s) to hold only
if s and s′ have the same histories. This means that the agent
knows what actions have occurred. To enforce this, we need
the following axiom which says that the situations accessible
from an initial situation are also initial.
Axiom 2 Init(s) ∧ B(s′, n, s) ⊃ Init(s′).
We have B as a relation so that we can exclude certain
situations altogether. We can think of these situations as
completely implausible. However, for the situations that are
assigned some plausibility, we want their plausibility to be
unique:
Axiom 3 Init(s) ∧ B(s′, n, s) ∧ B(s′, n′, s) ⊃ n = n′.
To ensure that the agent has positive and negative intro-
spection, we need to impose a constraint on the situations ac-
cessible from initial situations. As is well known (see, eg.,
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Figure 1: Introspection, exact sensing, and updating plausi-
bilities clash
Fagin et al. [1995]), to get positive and negative introspec-
tion in contexts without plausibilities, it suffices for the ac-
cessibility relation to be transitive and Euclidean. Our con-
straint is a generalization of the combination of transitivity
and Euclideanness that takes plausibilities into account. To
get positive and negative introspection, we only need the ac-
cessibility relation to be transitive and Euclidean over situa-
tions with plausibility 0. However, since we are dealing with
a dynamic framework, situations with higher plausibility lev-
els could later have plausibility 0, therefore we enforce these
constraints over all plausibility levels.
Axiom 4
Init(s) ⊃
(B(s′, n, s) ⊃ ∀s′′, n′′.B(s′′, n′′, s′) ≡ B(s′′, n′′, s)).
In other words, for initial s, if s′ is accessible from s with
some plausibility, then s and s′ have the same accessible sit-
uations with the same plausibilities.
Shapiro et al. described a conflict in their framework be-
tween preserving this constraint and updating plausibilities
which is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this example, S2 is acces-
sible from S with some unspecified plausibility, and S1 is
accessible from both S and S2 with plausibility n. Note that
this example satisfies the constraint described in Axiom 4 (if
we assume the situations are all initial). Now recall that for
Shapiro et al. sensing was assumed to be accurate. Therefore,
if the agent senses φ, the plausibility level of S1 with respect
to S should increase because they disagree on the value of φ,
whereas, the plausibility level of S1 with respect to S2 should
decrease because they agree on the value of φ. Therefore,
the generalization of the constraint described in Axiom 4 that
omits the condition that s be initial will not be satisfied after
sensing φ. This means that the agent may loose full intro-
spection.
The problem here is that in S, the sensor says that φ holds,
while in S2, the sensor says that φ does not hold. So, loosely
speaking, the agent in S1 is being told to revise its beliefs with
φ by S and with ¬φ by S2. In our framework, this problem
is avoided because all the situations that disagree with S on
the value of the sensor will be dropped from the accessibility
relation. In effect, the beliefs of the agent in all the surviving
accessible situation are revised by the same formula. In other
words, to avoid this problem, we (and Shapiro et al.) had
to model agents that have privileged access to their sensors,
i.e., they know the results of sensing. In the next section, we
give a theorem which says that we have indeed avoided this
problem.
Note that this problem only arises when beliefs are changed
due to sensing (and the agent is introspective). When an agent
senses φ, it is told whether φ holds. In the traditional be-
lief change setting, the agent is informed that φ holds. The
subtle, but crucial, difference is that in the former case, the
content of the belief-producing action depends on the actual
situation, but not in the latter. As we stated earlier, the prob-
lem illustrated in Fig. 1 is that in S, the sensor says that φ
holds, while in S2, the sensor says that φ does not hold. If
we were to model informing instead of sensing using the ac-
tion INFORM(φ), the value of φ in S and S2 would be irrel-
evant. In both situations, the agents beliefs would be revised
with φ. While there have been previous approaches to belief
revision with unreliable observations, e.g., [Aucher, 2005;
Bacchus et al., 1999; Boutilier et al., 1998; Laverny and
Lang, 2004] almost all of them use informing as the belief-
producing action rather than sensing. Bacchus et al. [1999]
model sensing (also in the framework of the situation calcu-
lus) as the nondeterministic choice of inform actions, one for
each possible value returned by the sensor, but they do not
address introspection. We think that there may be a problem
modelling sensing this way, in the presence of introspection
about future beliefs. If an agent believes φ then it should also
believe that it will believe φ after sensing φ. This would not
seem to hold in an approach like Bacchus et al.’s. Further-
more, we think it is more natural to model sensing as a prim-
itive action rather than a nondeterministic choice of actions.
One issue that remains to be resolved is how to ensure that
there is always at least one accessible situation. Since we are
modelling noisy sensing, the agent’s sensors could say that φ
holds and later say that φ does not hold. How do we then pre-
vent the agent’s beliefs from lapsing into inconsistency? We
need to ensure that regardless of the history of sensing results,
for each action a, there is always an accessible situation (but
not necessarily a most plausible one) that agrees with actual
situation on the value returned by the sensor associated with
a, and that value is correct, i.e.:
∀a, s∃s′, n.B(s′, n, s)∧(SR(a, s′) ≡ SR(a, s))∧Correct(a, s′).
We believe we can achieve this using an axiom similar to the
one given by Lakemeyer and Levesque [1998], and we will
investigate this in future work.
6 Properties
In this section, we give some properties of our axiomatiza-
tion of belief change and show that it does not suffer from
the problem discussed by Shapiro et al. Let Σ be the foun-
dational axioms together with the axioms of the previous sec-
tion. First, we can show that the constraints imposed on the
initial state given in Axioms 3 and 4 are preserved over all
sequences of actions.
Theorem 1
Σ |= ∀n, n′, s′, s.B(s′, n, s) ∧ B(s′, n′, s) ⊃ n = n′,
Σ |= ∀n, n′′, s, s′, s′′.
B(s′, n, s) ⊃ ∀s′′, n′′.B(s′′, n′′, s′) ≡ B(s′′, n′′, s).
The latter property ensures that the agent always has full in-
trospection, and shows that we do not suffer from the problem
of combining sensing, introspection, and updating plausibili-
ties discussed in the previous section.
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Corollary 2
Σ |= ∀s.Bel(φ, s) ⊃ Bel(Bel(φ), s),
Σ |= ∀s.¬Bel(φ, s) ⊃ Bel(¬Bel(φ), s).
Shapiro et al. discussed a possible solution to their problem
with updating plausibilities by setting the plausibility levels
from all accessible situations to be the same as they are in the
actual situation. However, they showed that this solution was
unsatisfactory by giving an example using this scheme that
entailed a counterintuitive property, namely, that the agent
believes φ, but thinks that after sensing φ, it will believe ¬φ.
We can show that it is not possible to construct such an ex-
ample in our framework that is reasonable. In particular, we
show that in any such example, the agent believes that either
its sensor is incorrect or that its beliefs will be inconsistent
after sensing φ. The second alternative is clearly not reason-
able. We would not want to model an agent that believes φ
but also believes that after sensing φ its beliefs will become
inconsistent. The first alternative does not make sense either
because we are modelling agents that revise their beliefs ac-
cording to what their sensors tell them. If the agent were to
believe that its sensor is not correct, then it would not make
sense to revise its beliefs according to what the sensor said.
So, while the agent might be aware that its sensors are not
always correct, we want to avoid situations where the agent
actually believes that its sensor will return the wrong value.
Accordingly, the next theorem says that if the agent believes
φ and it thinks that it will believe ¬φ after sensing φ, and a is
a sensing action for φ that does not change the value of φ if it
holds initially, then the agent believes that either its sensor is
incorrect or that its beliefs will be inconsistent after sensing
φ.
Theorem 3
Σ |= ∀a, s.Bel(φ, s) ∧ Bel(Bel(¬φ, do(a, Now)), s) ∧
(∀s′.SF(a, s′) ≡ φ(s′)) ∧
(∀s′.φ[s′] ⊃ φ[do(a, s′)]) ⊃
Bel([¬Correct(a, Now) ∨
Bel(FALSE , do(a, Now))], s)
Next, we show that the agent will revise its beliefs appro-
priately. If an action a (ideally) senses a property φ, and the
sensor indicates that φ holds, then after sensing, the agent
will believe that φ held before the sensing occurred. We first
define what it means for φ to hold in the previous situation:
Prev(φ, s) def= ∃a, s′.s = do(a, s′) ∧ φ[s′].
Theorem 4
Σ |= ∀a, s.(∀s′.SF(a, s′) ≡ φ[s′]) ∧ SR(a, s) ⊃
Bel(Prev(φ), do(a, s)).
If the agent also believes that a does change the value of φ,
then the agent will believe φ after doing a.
Since the basis of our framework is a theory of action, be-
lief updates are handled naturally as resulting from physical
actions. We show that (as with Shapiro et al.) belief updates
are handled appropriately. If a is a physical action (i.e., SF
and SR are identically true) and situation s has at least one
accessible situation with 0-plausibility, and the agent believes
that a causes φ′ to hold if φ holds initially, then the agent will
believe that φ′ holds after doing a in s, if it believes that φ
holds in s.
Theorem 5
Σ |= ∀a, s.(∃s′.B(s′, 0, s)) ∧
(∀s′.SF(a, s′)) ∧ (∀s′.SR(a, s′)) ∧
Bel((φ(Now) ⊃ φ′(do(a, Now))), s) ∧ Bel(φ, s) ⊃
Bel(φ′, do(a, s))
Finally, we can show that Shapiro et al.’s framework is a
special case of ours. If we assume that sensing is always ac-
curate, and for every action a, every situation has an acces-
sible situation that agrees with it on the value of the sensor
associated with a, then Shapiro et al.’s axioms for B and pl
combined and translated into our notation follow from our ax-
ioms.
Theorem 6
Σ |= (∀a, s.Correct(a, s)) ∧
[∀a, s∃s′.B(s′, 0, s) ∧ (SR(a, s′) ≡ SR(a, s))] ⊃
∀a, s′′, n′′, s.B(s′′, n′′, do(a, s) ≡
∃s′.B(s′, n′′, s) ∧ s′′ = do(a, s′) ∧
(SF(a, s′) ≡ SF(a, s)).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced a framework for modelling be-
lief change as a result of noisy sensing in the situation cal-
culus, where the agent has full introspection of its beliefs.
Our framework allows the updating of plausibilities of situ-
ations, and we showed that we resolved the difficulty with
combining all these elements discussed by Shapiro et al.
[2000], and to achieve this, we had to endow the agent with
infallible knowledge of the results of its sensing. As previ-
ously mentioned, there are some issues that are as yet unre-
solved. One is how to specify the SR predicate. Another is
how to ensure that there are enough situations with the right
properties to prevent the agent’s beliefs from lapsing into
inconsistency. We would also like to investigate the extent
to which our framework satisfies the standard belief change
postulates [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988;
Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991]. Lastly, we would like to ex-
tend the framework to handle unreliable physical actions, i.e.,
physical actions whose outcomes may be different from those
expected by the agent.
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